Investor protection regimes have been shown to partly explain why the same type of corporate event may attract di¤erent investor reactions across countries. We compare the value e¤ects of large bank merger announcements in Europe and the US and …nd an inverse relationship between the level of investor protection prevalent in the target country and abnormal returns that bidders realize during the announcement period. Accordingly, bidding banks realize higher returns when targeting low protection economies (most European economies) than bidders targeting institutions which operate under a high investor protection regime (the US). We argue that bidding bank shareholders need to be compensated for an increased risk of expropriation by insiders which they face in a low protection environment where takeover markets are illiquid and there are high private bene…ts of control.
James and Weir, 1987) . The authors observe increased levels of takeover market activity and a higher propensity for bidding wars in countries with more elaborate shareholder protection rights, possibly because these regimes facilitate a more freely-operating market for corporate control. Moeller and Schlingemann ) …nd that acquisition targets operating within more liquid takeover markets diminish the announcement period returns that bidding shareholders realize. For a sample of cross-border deals involving targets in the UK, Canada, France and Germany, the authors show that acquisitions of UK companies attract the least favorable market reaction. They attribute the low bidder returns for UK acquisitions to lower agency conAict in markets where targets bene…t from sophisticated shareholder protection rights as well to a higher likelihood of bidding wars for attractive targets causing merger-related gains to be bid away. By the same token, Starks and Wei (2004) argue that bidders have to pay higher premiums for targets located in relatively more sophisticated protection environments in an e¤ort to compensate target shareholders for poorer governance practices following mergers.
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The evidence on the valuation e¤ects of mergers in di¤erent investor protection regimes is rather limited for banking …rms. 2003) , in an international sample of bank merger activity, …nds higher abnormal returns for a portfolio of non-US acquirers (including Japanese and European banks) visGIGQ0s bidding banks in the US. While the author suggests that this result is driven by underlying di¤erences in …nancial systems, she does not control for the impact of investor protection on her 1 R ather than the negative value e¤ect of investor protection in the targets country on bidder returns hypothesized in this study, the opposite e¤ect is also conceivable. ahlquist et al. (2003) , for example, argue that bidders may be rewarded for acquisitions in high protection economies owing to the higher company disclosure standards as well as lower agency and transaction costs associated with MTA in these regulatory environments. While Bris and Cabolis (2004) …nd some evidence consistent with this in a sample of cross-border mergers the authors detect higher bidder returns for MTA targeted at companies in countries where corruption is less widespread they do not …nd bidder returns to increase with more general measures of investor protection (such as creditor or shareholder rights).
S
…ndings. Similarly, Kiymaz (2004) reports that the wealth e¤ects for bidding institutions vary with the location of the target. In a sample of cross-border acquisitions made by US …nancial …rms, deals targeted at …nancial institutions in Latin America and East Asia lead to higher value gains for bidding …rms. Again, di¤erences in investor protection are not among the conditions examined by the author.
…ndings can be summarized as follows. The main …nding of the paper is a negative market reaction to bidders that leverage acquisitions valued at more than
m illion in the context of high investor protection regimes (i.e. the US and UK), while bidders targeting low protection environments (i.e. most European economies) realize positive abnormal returns. We interpret our …nding of negative bidder announcement returns to deals where targets operate under a high investor protection regime as evidence of acquirers …nding it di¢ cult to capture acquisition-related gains from a target in the liquid (and, hence, competitive) takeover markets associated with this type of corporate governance system (see La Porta et al.,
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2``cde Accordingly, the bidder losses signal a favorable stock market assessment of the f ¢ ciency of internal governance and external control mechanisms employed by target institutions. Conversely, in low investor protection environments, a less freely-operating market for corporate control lets bidders earn superior announcement returns by compensating them for the higher private bene…ts of control, as well as higher agency and information asymmetry costs.
We also …nd that bidding bank losses in the context of activity-diversifying bank mergers are more prevalent when targeted at European rather than at US institutions. We suggest that this is because …nancial conglomeration increases investor concerns over their ability to assess the true value of a target and the synergistic bene…ts of a proposed transaction if the targfgis disclosure practices are weak.
Further, investor preference for cash-…nanced bank mergers is particularly strong in Europe, thus, V f r ecting the higher risk of expropriation associated with equity in a low investor protection environment. Also, we …nd evidence that European cross-border MpA creates bidder wealth if acquisition targets are located in a less sophisticated protection environment than their acquirers.
Finally, another contribution of our paper is that we can shed some light on the di¤erent value e¤ects surrounding bank mergers in Europe and the US which to date have largely been left unaccounted for in the bank merger literature.
In two recent papers related to ours, Bris and Cabolis (2004) for the election of directors and the approval of major corporate issues (see Table 2 ). Based on six di¤erent anti-director rights, the index varies from 0 to with higher numbers indicating better protection for shareholders from expropriation by management. We follow ssi and Volpin (2004) (which tend to rely on some measure of company size or pro…tability) meaningful (La Porta et al., 2000) . Table 2 presents the country scores for both investor protection measures.
Panel B of
ut of the sample countries, common-law countries (the UK the US) exhibit very high standards of investor protection, while Italy, Germany and Belgium (civil-law countries) score relatively low in this respect.
As for the quality of accounting standards, Table 2 suggests that Sweden, the UK and the US have leading positions while corporate disclosure practices lack transparency in Portugal, Greece and Austria.
able Although the two investor protection indices measure somewhat di¤erent institutional characteristics, there is a strong association between the two measures. First, this is evident in a strong correlation between shareholder protection and accounting quality (r¡£¤¥ signi…cant at which assumes a linear relationship between the expected return on security i (R it ) and the return on a market portfolio (R mt ): 
This procedure prevents securities with large variances from dominating the test. Subsequently, we use the abnormal return statistics reported in Boehmer et al. (1991) to correct for increases in the variance of abnormal returns that is common for merging parties at announcement. Failure to account for event-induced increases in variance leaves tests misspeci…ed, while there is only a small loss of statistical power associated with using the following procedure if historic and event window variance are identical (Cowan and Sergeant,
This yields the following test statistic:
As a robustness test, we account for the non-normal distribution of security returns by using a sign test as suggested in Corrado (1989) to detect abnormal share price performance. The use of non-parametric test statistics makes inferences less sensitive to the e¤ects of outliers.
r ca s ts r Ab r a t r s Moeller and Schlingemann, 200ÌÃÏ Consequently, we hypothesize that US bidders (because they tend to target US institutions) realize abnormal returns that are negative on average. Low investor protection environments, on the other hand, su¤er from increased agency conáict and, thus, exhibit less liquid markets for corporate control (La Porta et al., 1998) . European bidders are likely to bene…t from subdued competition levels for attractive acquisition targets by gaining access to higher abnormal returns in the takeover market than those bidders that predominantly target high protection economies.
Panel A of Table   Ì shows that roughly three-quarters of bank , a major …nding is that, in contrast to US transactions, bidding bank shareholders in Europe do not realize any statistically signi…cant wealth losses as a result of bank MøA.
The losses pertaining to US investors range from -1.ùëï on the announcement day to -0.öùï for
Most critically, the last row in Panel A of Table   é con…rms that the abnormal returns of European bank merger announcements are signi…cantly higher than those associated with US acquisiûåüýþã a result which is signi…cant for all event window speci…cations. While the positive ô õ ä
for European bidding banks are consistent with the …ndings of Cybüòÿttone and
Murgia (2000), this study is the …rst to show that bidders in Europe realize higher announcement returns than US institutions using a direct comparison of the value e¤ects of MøA activities in both geographic regions.
To explore the impact of investor protection applicable to targets on bidder wealth directly, Panel B
of Table   é ranks the full sample into ten portfolios based on the magnitude of the é ò ó S y abnormal returns that bidders realize. Consistent with the notion that merger-related gains may easily be bid away in the type of competitive takeover markets prevalent in high protection environments, we observe that acquisitions in the lowest return decile occur in countries where targets enjoy one of the highest levels of investor protection (as measured in terms of both shareholder protection and accounting quality). By the same token, bidder returns are especially pronounced where targets operate in low protection environments. In low protection environments, investors may demand compensation for lower governance standards and a higher risk of expropriation by insiders. Tests of the equality of means con…rm statistically signi…cant di¤erences in both target protection measures between the top, middle and bottom return portfolio.
r ct rs cat a st r r t ct ¡ ent regulatory changes in the US (above all, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999) repealed boundaries between di¤erent types of …nancial services such as banking and insurance as well as between retail and investment banking (Berger et al., 1999 However, an important aspect about cross-border mergers is that they tend to be cross-r mergers. Next to a transfer of legal ownership, cross-border mergers usually also entail a transfer of the corporate governance regime that is relevant to the target when the bidd}s accounting and general disclosure laws are adopted by the acquired …rm in the post-merger period (Bris and Cabolis, 2004).
We, thus, expect the market reaction to cross-border MkA to be inuenced by di¤erences in the quality of investor protection regimes between bidders and targets. Starks and Wei (2004) observe that bidders pay a lower control premium for acquisition targets domiciled in investor protection regimes that are less sophisticated than that of the bidder. For our sample, we posit that if acquisitions are made in the context of protection regimes which are less sophisticated than that of the bidding bank, bidders will realize higher announcement period returns. This is because bidding shareholders have to be compensated for acquisitions in environments with less ei cient internal and external control mechanisms.
We test directly the argument that di¤erences in investor protection between merging banks have market valuation e¤ects in cross-border MkA. If bidders have multiple listings, the highest protection environment in which the acquirers shares are traded is the e¤ective level of protection enjoyed by bidding bank shareholders.
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We …nd that, with the exception of In Table 9 we present evidence on how the mode of takeover …nance (cash, equity, or a mixture of both) impacts upon merger announcement returns. As a percentage of total transactions, Europe has a substantially higher share of cash-…nanced takeovers (4µ± ¶ compared with the US (µ±· By the same token, the share of purely equity-…nanced deals is much smaller in Europe (3¸± than in the US (£¹±· This is consistent with § º
and Volpin (2004) who observe for a sample of cross-border mergers that there is a preference for all-cash bids in countries with less sophisticated rights for minority shareholders. Against the background of an increased risk of expropriation for minority shareholders 1 0 For example, Germany»s under a low protection regime, target shareholders are less likely to accept the bidÁÂÃÄs equity as a transaction currency outside the US or the UK.
The use of equity as acquisition currency is believed to signal to investors that the bidderÄs equity is overvalued and the proposed transaction, hence, less desirable at the …nancial terms o¤ered (Becher, 2000É Anderson et al., 2004 . We expect that cash-…nanced deals receive a more positive market reaction than other forms of takeover …nance and that any value premium associated with cash over other forms of acquisition …nance is larger in low protection regimes. The results in Table 9 show that abnormal returns associated with all-cash bids are positive and statistically signi…cant in Europe (Panel A.1) and negative and signi…cant in the US (Panel B.1). More fundamentally, however, the results are broadly consistent with cash …nance generating higher abnormal returns than non-cash …nance in both
Europe and the US.
Ê n tËÌ, the di¤erence in mean abnormal returns associated with cash-and non-cash …nance deals is 1.90Í in Europe and 1.ÎÏÍ in the US (statistically signi…cant at the
el, respectively). While di¤erences in the market reaction to all-cash and non-cash …nance are not statistically signi…cant over longer examination periods, the positive value e¤ect of cash …nance tends to be more pronounced in Europe than in the US over most event windows.
Next, we examine whether investor preference for cash-…nance varies with the value of the proposed bank merger. We de…ne relative bid size as the ratio of deal value to the market value of the bidÁÂÃÄs equity in the …scal year before the merger announcement. Even though abnormal returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero and based on very small sample sizes for most subsamples, the positive value e¤ect of cash-…nance is among the strongest when European acquirers undertake low relative value Next, we use a second index of investor protection as a robustness test. We replace shareholder protection as a proxy for the level of investor protection in Columns 4 and S of Table 10 with an index of the quality of accounting standards applying to target banks. 
b st ss
Prior to our analysis, we veri…ed the accuracy of the event dates supplied by Thomson Financial.
Following Moeller and Schlingemann
, we analyzed changes in the trading volumes of the acquirer on the announcement date. If market-adjusted volumes increase signi…cantly on ta¢, this is interpreted as evidence of an accurately reported announcement date. In total, four deals have been omitted from the sample using this technique. Next, we used di¤erent event window lengths (3-day, 11-day
for the multivariate analysis.¨ur main results do not chang© our conclusions are, thus, not contingent on the use of a particular event window speci…cation.
We also examined the sensitivity of the co©e cient on shareholder protection for cash Table 10 for subsamples of cash and non-cash deals. We obtain broadly similar results with the statistical signi…cance of the investor protection variable remaining at or below ¤ for all speci…cations.
Next, we classi…ed all bank acquisitions valued at more than h © to the dominance of US transactions in our sample, we verify that the negative relationship between both target protection measures and bidder abnormal returns, as identi…ed for the entire sample in Section 2.2, also exists in a non-US context. We rank bidder performance of European deals by return quintiles and …nd shareholder protection for targets in the lowest quintile to be signi…cantly higher (at While the multivariate regressions demonstrate that shareholder protection and accounting quality have comparable e¤ects in the market for corporate control, the indices still measure somewhat di¤erent institutional characteristics. In Section 2.2, we have identi…ed
mostly targeted at civil law-based countries like Switzerland and Germany that combine strong accounting regulations with a relatively weak form of investor protect9AB8 where the two measures point to di¤erent conclusions. We examine whether the market reaction to M$A di¤ers in cases where the two measures do not reach a conclusive assessment of the level of investor protection that is prevalent in the target country by using interaction terms between a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a discrepancy between the two measures and target eps, deal value, and acquirer cost. None of the interaction terms enter our regressions at customary signi…cance levels. Consequently, there is no evidence of a modi…ed investor reaction to bank merger announcement targeted at countries where the level of investor protection is relatively ambiguous. ect an optimistic market assessment of the acqui&'&s ability to extract economic gains from targets in a low investor protection environment. By contrast, high investor protection regim'78 characterized by market-based governance, a less pronounced manager-shareholder con(ict and a much more competitive market for corporate contrA58 make it more Table 7 The Diversification Effect by Shareholder Protection Quality, CAR (t-2; t+2)
Five-day abnormal returns (market model) are presented for three portfolios depending on the quality of shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 1998) . Shareholder protection applies to targets and is based on an index of anti-director rights (varying between 0 and 6) multiplied by an index of the rule of law (varying between 0 and 10). Product-focusing mergers involve banks where the first two digits of the four-digit SIC code of their main product line are identical. Paired t-tests are used to determine differences in means and assume unequal variances. (**,***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Paired t-tests are used to determine differences in means assuming unequal variances.
Table 9 Method of Payment and Announcement Returns
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal returns are calculated against Datastream bank sector indexes using market model regressions. Abnormal returns are averaged over each event window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardized prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return variance following merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 1991) , and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989) . Transactions that were completely paid for in cash are classified as all-cash bids with the remaining deals (equity, mixed finance) classified as 'not all-cash'. Relative bid size is the deal value divided by the bidder's market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year prior to the merger announcement. Bid sizes above and below the sample mean are examined separately.
(t-20; t+5) (t-10; t+1) (t-2; t+2) (t-1; t+1) 0 The 5-day CAR are regressed against investor protection proxies in the target country and a vector of controlling variables. Shareholder protection is an index of anti-director rights multiplied by an index if the quality of law enforcement (both from La Porta et al., 1998) and accounting standards capture the quality of local disclosure practices of accounting information (also from La Porta et al., 1998). The control variables are from the Worldscope database. They include earnings per share of the target (EPS), return on equity (ROE); relative ROE is the ROE of the target divided by the ROE of the acquirer (all in t-1). Deal values are the logarithm of the dollar value of the M&A transaction; cross-border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions where target and acquirers are located in different countries; product focus is measured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the first two digits of the four-digit SIC code of the companies in a merger are identical and 0 otherwise. The cash-only dummy is 1 if a transaction is 100% cash-financed and 0 otherwise. Total costs are expressed on a per-employee basis and non-interest income is measured as the share of non-interest income to the total of non-interest and interest income (in t-1).
(1) 
